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et al.: Rosenthal v. Warren & New England Baptist Hospital

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ROSENTHAL V. WARREN & NEW ENGLAND
BAPTIST HOSPITAL
CONFLICT OF LAws-475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 413
US

-, 42 USLW 3197 (Oct. 9, 1973).

The federal diversity case of Rosenthal v. Warren afforded
the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, the opportunity to examine New York's choice-of-law rules.' In so doing,
the Second Circuit failed to recognize the import of Neumeier v.
Keuhner,2 in which the New York Court of Appeals declared a
change in its choice-of-law policy from an absolute "interest analysis" approach to one which in certain circumstances would cause
courts to look automatically to the place of the alleged tort for the
applicable law: The Neumeier holding may be read to limit this
policy change to "situations involving guest statutes in conflict
settings."'3 However, when this limitation is viewed in light of the
development of New York's choice-of-law theory, one has to conclude that the limitation was not meant to exist and that the
Neumeier decision should be given broad controlling effect.4
In Rosenthal, the plaintiff, the widow and Executrix of the
Estate of Dr. Martin C. Rosenthal, instituted a wrongful death
action against the defendants, the New England Baptist Hospital
and Dr. Kenneth W. Warren, alleging that they were negligent
with respect to their examination, diagnosis, treatments and care
of Dr. Rosenthal. The doctor died following surgery performed at
the defendant hospital in Boston, Massachusetts. At the time of
Dr. Rosenthal's death, he, his wife, and their three minor children
were residents and domiciliaries of New York.
1. In a diversity case, a federal court must look to the choice-of-law theory of the
forum state. Klaxon v. Stenton Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). At the
time of Klaxon, most states followed the lex loci delecti rule. Under that rule, the substantive rights of the parties are governed by the law of the place where the wrong occurred.
See, Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1940). Thus, choice-of-law was not a serious
problem. Today, however, with the fall of the lex loci delecti rule in many jurisdictions,
see, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1963), a

serious problem results with the application of choice-of-law rules.
2. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).

3. Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
4. Twerski, Numeier v. Keuhner: Where are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HoFsnTA L.
REv. 104, 121 (1973). Contra, Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 CoLtUm. L.
REv. 548, 562 (1971).
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The plaintiff's action against New England Baptist Hospital
was commenced in the Supreme Court of New York, Westchester
County, by the personal service of a summons upon an officer of
the hospital.5 The plaintiff obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction over
Dr. Warren to the extent of the defendant's insurance coverage
by means of a Seider attachment.' The defendants removed the
case to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York on grounds of diversity of citizenship. 7
The District Court, in determining whether New York or
Massachusetts law should govern, held New York law applicable
and granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment
striking the defendant's affirmative defenses. These were based
upon Massachusetts' $50,000 limit on damages recoverable in
death actions.8 An interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1292(b), was taken to the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, by
the defendants solely on the question of whether the courts of
New York would apply a Massachusetts Wrongful Death Statute9
to the facts of this case. The Second Circuit affirmed the District
Court's decision. 0
Judge Oakes' majority opinion began by reviewing the development of New York's choice-of-law rules, and found that with
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc." in 1961 and Babcock v.
5. The officer was served in New York City while soliciting funds for the Hospital.
Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438, 440 (2d Cir. 1973); Brief for plaintiff, at 2.
6. The attached property was the obligation of the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company to defend and indemnify defendant Warren contained in a liability insurance policy issued to the Lahey Clinic Foundation and under which defendant was a
covered insured.
A Seider attachment is a quasi-in-rem procedure whereby a New York plaintiff may
obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant regardless of the situs of the tort by
attaching the defendant's insurance company's obligation to defendant. See Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21
N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d
106 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Thus, Seider attachments
invariably involve choice-of-law questions. See generally, Carpenter, New York's Expanding Empire in Tort Jurisdiction:Quo Vadis?, 22 HASTINS L.J. 1173, 1179 (1971).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
8. Rosenthal v. Warren, 342 F.Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 438 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. _
42 U.S.L.W. 3197 (Oct. 9, 1973).
9. Mass. Stat. 1965, ch. 683 § 1, as amended MASS. GEN. L. ANNO. ch. 229 § 2(Supp.
1973).
10. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 413 U.S. -,
42 U.S.L.W. 3197 (Oct.
9, 1973).
11. 9 N.Y. 2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). In Kilberg, plaintiff's
decedent, a New York resident, purchased his ticket and boarded the defendant's aircraft
in New York to fly to Nantucket, Massachusetts. The decedent was killed when the plane
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Jackson'2 in 1963, the New York courts stopped using the traditional lex loci delecti rule and instead developed an interest analysis approach. Generally, this interest analysis approach has led
to a refusal to apply the damage-limiting laws of other jurisdictions where one of the parties in an action is a New York domiciliary.' 3 However, Judge Oakes did not consider the latest case,
Neumeier v. Keuhner", to substantially change New York's
choice-of-law policy. Thus, Judge Oakes found that the New York
interest and public policy of not limiting damages in wrongful
death actions as reflected in its state constitution,"5 predominates
over any interest which Massachusetts may have in protecting its
defendants. Additionally, he found that whatever expectations
the defendants had that Massachusetts law would be applied
were "legally irrelevant" since New York no longer followed16"this
contractual type of approach to multistate tort problems.
crashed in Nantucket. The New York Court of Appeals refused to apply the Massachusetts
limitations on wrongful death damages. The Court expressed a paternalistic attitude
toward its own citizens by saying "[In air travel]. . .The place of injury becomes entirely
fortuitous. Our courts should if possible provide protection for our own State's people
against unfair and anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters." 9 N.Y.2d at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
12. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). Babcock dealt with a
guest-host relationship where both the driver and passenger of an auto were New York
domiciliaries. During a weekend pleasure trip in Canada, they had an accident while
passing through the province of Ontario. The question for the New York court was whether
the Ontario Guest Statute should apply. In holding that it should not, the court used an
"interest analysis" approach to the conflict of laws problem, saying that "controlling
effect. . . [should be given]. . .to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation." 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d
at 749.
13. See Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968) (4-3
decision); Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App.Div.2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st. Dept. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 24 N.Y.2d 942, 250 N.E.2d 68, 302 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1969).
In Miller, the New York Court of Appeals held that Maine's limitation of $20,000 in
wrongful death cases should not be applied where a New York resident was killed in Maine
while a passenger in an automobile registered in Maine, and operated by a Maine resident.
The court repeated its Kilberg approach and again New York's public policy against
wrongful death limitations was stressed. Additionally, the court found that New York's
"governmental interest" was based on the fact that an arbitrary limit on damages for the
death of a New York resident constituted a financial burden on his New York dependent
beneficiaries, which might ultimately have to be borne by the State of New York. The
court saw no countervailing Maine "interest" which could displace New York law, noting
that Maine's statute "dealing as it does with the nature of the remedy. . .is obviously not
the kind of statute which regulates conduct." 22 N.Y.2d at 19, 237 N.E.2d at 881, 290
N.Y.S.2d at 740.
14. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
15. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 16. (McKinney 1969).
16. 475 F.2d at 444.
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Judge Lumbard, dissenting, characterized the majority opinion as an application of a per se rule rather than of an interest
analysis approach.' 7 The dissent urged that an interest analysis
approach would clearly have led to the application of Massachu-

setts law, since the decedent deliberately chose to go to the defendant Massachusetts Hospital for surgery performed by a doctor
who did not practice outside of Massachusetts. Judge Lumbard
stressed that the tort in Rosenthal was purely local, and thus,
despite Dr. Rosenthal's New York domicile, Massachusetts interests should prevail. Surprisingly, the dissent did not rely on
Neumier for support.
Skipping a Few Lines from the Fact Pattern
The importance of Neumeier cannot be overemphasized.
Neumier was the product of New York's experience in the
conflict-of-laws area and it reflects a sharp change in New York's
choice-of-law policy from a pure "interest analysis" approach to
a combination of "interest analysis" and "terratorialism."' 8

In Neumejer, the plaintiffs intestate, an Ontario resident,
was killed in that province while a guest in a car driven by the

defendant, a New Yorker. The Special Term court denied the
plaintiff's motion to strike an affirmative defense 9 predicated

upon Ontario's guest statute." The Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, reversed 2' on the authority of Tooker v. Lopez." On
17. Id. A per se rule would require the application of New York law whenever the
plaintiff was a New York resident. Such a rule raises serious constitutional questions. See
generally, Carpenter, New York's Expanding Empire in Tort Jurisdiction:Quo Vadis? 22
HASTINGs

L.J. 1173, 1179 (1971).

18. See generally, Symposium, Neumeier v. Keuhner: A Conflicts Conflict, 1
HOFSTRA L. REv. 93 (1973).
19. 63 Misc.2d 766, 313 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. 1970) rev'd 37 App. Div. 2d
70, 322 N.Y.S.2d 867 (4th Dept. 1971) rev'd 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d
64 (1972).
20. Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario, ONT. REv. STAT., ch. 172, § 105(2)
(1960), as amended, Stat. of 1966, ch. 64, § 20(2).
21. 37 App. Div.2d 70, 322 N.Y.S.2d 867 (4th Dept. 1971), rev'd, 31 N.Y.S.2d 121,
286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
22. 24 N.Y.S.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
In Tooker the question was whether a Michigan Guest Statute should apply to a
wrongful death action involving two New York domiciliaries, Michigan State University
co-eds, where the guest-host relationship arose in Michigan and where the automobile trip
and the fatal crash occurred entirely in Michigan. In a 4-3 decision, the New York Court
of Appeals concluded that the Michigan statute did not govern. However, the real significance of Tooker lies in its implied rejection of the notion that in a death action New York
would always apply the New York death statute, which further implies a fear of any per
se rule (dictum). This significance became apparent in Neumeier.
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appeal by permission to the New York Court of Appeals, the
Appellate Division's decision was reversed and the Special
Term's Order was reinstated.? The Court of Appeals, in the words
24
of Chief Judge Fuld, stressed that:
...the Appellate Division misread our decision in the Tooker
case . . . [I]n Tooker, the guest-passenger and the host-driver
were both domiciled in New York, and our decision-that New
York law was controlling-was based upon, and limited to, that
fact situation.
What significantly and effectively differentiates the present
case is the fact that, although the host was a domiciliary of New
York, the guest, for whose death recovery is sought, was domiciled in Ontario . . . It is clear that, although New York has a
deep interest in a foreign state, against unfair or anachronistic
statutes of that state, it has no legitimate interest in ignoring
the public policy of a foreign jurisdiction-such as Ontario-and
in protecting the plaintiff guest domiciled and injured there
from legislation obviously addressed, at the very least, to a resident riding in a vehicle traveling within its borders.
Chief Judge Fuld then examined the consequences of earlier
decisions stating that "our decisions in multi-state highway accident cases, particularly in those involving guest-host controversies, have . . . lacked consistency."25 While acknowledging the
soundness of the court's abandonment of the lex loci doctrine, the
noted jurist argued that "[tihere is, however, no reason why
choice-of-law rules, more narrow than those previously devised,
should not be successfully developed, in order to assure a greater
degree of predictability and uniformity. 2' 6 He then quoted portions of his concurring opinion in Tooker which expressed the
view that Babcock, and the decisions based on it, had given the
court insight into the policies which should govern this area of the
law. Therefore, he concluded, the court "may proceed to the next
stage in the evolution of the law-the formulation of a few rules
of general applicability, promising a fair level of predictability."27
23. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
24. Id. at 125-126, 286 N.E.2d at 455-456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 67-68.
25. Id. at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
26. Id.; for a discussion of the lack of consistency, the need for predictability, and
the desirability of rules of general applicability, see Rosenberg, "Comments on Reich v.
Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 641 (1968).
27. Id.
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Before listing the rules, however, Judge Fuld noted that "although

. .,.

no rule may be formulated to guarantee a satisfac-

tory result in every case," the principles announced by the court
would be "sound for situations involving guest statutes in conflict
settings." The following rules were adopted by the Neumeier
29

court:

1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the car is there registered, the law
of that state should control and determine the standard of care
which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his
domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for that
conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that
liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the
state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was
injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits
recovery, the driver who has come into that state should not-in
the absence of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose
the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver
are domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of
the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be shown
that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the
relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth
working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
The Neumeier rules pose a problem of interpretation in two
areas. First, should they be limited in application to guest-host
disputes and secondly should they be limited to questions of liability? It can be *arguedthat a broad application was intended by
the Neumeier court in spite of the lack of clarity in its language
and that the rules are thus appropriate in settings such as
Rosenthal.
In Rosenthal, the tort occurred in Massachusetts because the
hospital was located and the surgery performed in that state. It
28. Id.
29. Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70. Surprisingly, the Second
Circuit relied upon these "rules" [hereinafter referred to as the "Neumeier rules"] a year
earlier in Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272 (2d. Cir. 1971). Pryor was not cited in either
the majority or dissenting opinion in Rosenthal v. Warren. See generally, Pryor v.Swarner: Guest Statute InterestsAnalysis, and Confusion in the Conflict of Laws, 1972 UTAH
L. Rav. 312. Cf. Chila v. Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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was Dr. Rosenthal's decision to seek medical attention in Massachusetts which brought about the involvement of the defendants
in this case. There was nothing fortuitous in the situs of the
wrong, in contrast to cases involving plane crashes and automobile accidents, which the Babcock court regarded as transitory
torts. 0 When Neumeier rule II is applied to transitory torts, it
becomes clear that a per se rule based solely on a plaintiff's New
York residence should no longer be followed, as rule I dictates the
application of the law of the defendant's domicile when the situs
of the wrong was the defendant's home state. If a per se rule is,
therefore, inappropriate in cases involving transitory torts, a
fortiori, it is inapplicable in a case such as Rosenthal where the
situs of the wrong was not at all fortuitous.
One might be troubled, however, by the application of the
Neumeier rules to the Rosenthal case for the following reason.
The Neumeier rules, which admittedly deal with questions of
liability, might not be appropriate for questions involving limitations on recovery as is the case in Rosenthal. The authors submit,
however, that limitations on damage awards in wrongful death
actions are determinative of the extent to which a state casts
liability on a defendant.
For example, State A imposes a $100,000 limit on wrongful
death recoveries. In a wrongful death action between two domiciliaries of State A, and thus in the absence of any choice-of-law
problems, assuming that the plaintiff could prove actual damages
in excess of $100,000 the plaintiff could not recover such excess
since State A does not cast the defendant in liability beyond the
damage limitation. Taking this argument one step further by
adding a choice-of-law factor-a New York plaintiff suing a State
A defendant in a New York court on a cause of action for wrongful
death which arose in State A-should not Neumier rule II apply?
State A does not cast the defendant in liability in excess of the
damage limitation. If the wrongful death action is treated as a
medical malpractice suit we then have the fact pattern of
Rosenthal v. Warren.
In light of the foregoing arguments, it would have been appropriate for the Second Circuit, in deciding Rosenthal, to apply
Neumeier rule II in the following manner:
When the [defendants'] conduct occurred in the state of his
domicile and that state [Massachusetts] does not cast him in
30. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 480, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748 (1963).
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liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason
of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the
tort law of the state [New York] of the [plaintiffs] domicile.
Regretably, both the majority and dissenting opinons in
Rosenthalfailed to give weight to the Neumeier rules. As a result,
it is probable that Federal District Courts sitting in New York
will be faced with an increased diversity case load, which, by its
very nature, involves choice-of-law questions. This result flows
from the following factors: (1) The District Court and the Circuit
Court of Appeals must apply the choice-of-law of the forum
state;3 '1 they are not able to announce new choice-of-law rules. 2
Thus, a plaintiff would not run the risk of a change of choice-oflaw policy which could only occur from litigation within the state
court system.3 (2) In Federal Court, should a diversity case be
transferred on the grounds of forum non convenience, the transferee forum must apply the choice-of-law rules of the original
forum.3 4 Compare the result in state court, where forum non
convenience could result in a dismissal and plaintiff would have
to bring the action in the foreign state. 5 Thus, a plaintiff who
faces a forum non convenience problem runs no risk of the application of foreign law if he brings his action in Federal Court.
In view of the foregoing, it would be advisable for the Second
Circuit in handling diversity cases involving the application of
New York's choice-of-law theory to take the initiative in giving
the Neumeier rules the broad application which logic demands.
31. Klaxon v. Stenton Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
32. Klaxon v. Stenton Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-497 (1941).
33. Compare Chila v. Owens, 348 F.Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) with Neumeier v.
Keuhner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). In Chila, plaintiff was
able to obtain the benefit of New York law by bringing the action in Federal court on
diversity grounds. In Neumeier, the plaintiff, a Canadian, had to resort to the New York
state courts and thus suffered the consequences of the policy shift by the New York Court
of Appeals.
34. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
35. Silver v. American Insurance Company, 29 N.Y. 2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972).
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